Federal regulators this afternoon made public the report of their investigation into the March death of 34-year-old Jeremy Sigler at Alpha Natural Resources subsidiary Kingston Resources Inc.’s Kingston No. 2 Mine.
The report is available online here, and it concludes:
The mine operator failed to develop and implement a method of rib support for mining under deep cover which prevented hazardous rib rolls. The obvious hazardous conditions due to falling rib material were extensive during the development of the Number 1 Section, for a distance of 640 feet. Mine management took insufficient actions to prevent the existence of hazardous rib conditions and allowed miners to be exposed to the hazardous conditions for an extensive period of time on the Number 1 Section. Mine management performed inadequate examinations and failed to recognize the seriousness of the hazards present on the section.
Readers may recall that Sigler was killed when he was struck by material from the collapse of a wall at the underground mine, one of two Kingston subsidiary operations in the Mossy area of Fayette County, W.Va. The state Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training previously issued its own report on this incident.
The new MSHA report describes the incident this way:
On Saturday, March 10, 2012, at approximately 6:15 pm, Jeremy Sigler, a 34-year-old section foreman with 10 years of total mining experience, was killed when a large section of rib rolled out of the right side of the number 2 entry, which was being developed on the Number 1 Section. The victim was operating the section’s left side continuous mining machine at the time of the accident. The portion of the rib which struck the victim was 6 feet 7 inches long, 40 inches wide and varied in thickness from 1 to 10 inches, weighing approximately 1,800 lbs.
The accident occurred as the victim was operating the continuous mining machine, while mining an extended depth cut in the number 2 entry on the 004-0 Mechanized Mining Unit (MMU).
MSHA investigators listed two root causes for this fatality:
– The mine operator failed to develop and implement a method of rib support for mining under deep cover. A method of rib support was needed in order to mitigate the hazardous condition of rib rolls present at the mine.
— The mine operator failed to insure that adequate preshift examinations were being conducted and that all obvious hazardous conditions present were being reported.
The MSHA report listed these enforcement actions:
1. Order Number 8120865, was issued over the phone verbally at approximately 6:56 p.m. on March 10, 2012, under the provisions of section 103(j) of the Mine Act:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on March 10, 2012, when a section foreman was crushed by a rib fall while operating the left side continuous mining machine. This order was issued to prevent the destruction of any evidence which would assist in the investigation of the cause or causes of the accident. The 103(j) Order, Number 8120865, was modified on March 10, 2012 to a 103(k) order and was reduced to writing at 21:30 p.m.
This order was subsequently terminated on May 7, 2012. The operator obtained an approved roof control plan revision that included a systematic method of supporting the coal mine ribs while mining in areas that have a cover of greater than 1,000 feet.
2. Citation Number 7257552, was issued under the provisions of Section 104(d) of the Mine Act, for a violation of 30 CFR 75.202(a):
The operator failed to protect persons from hazards related to falls of ribs where persons were required to work and travel. The ribs on the Number 1 Section where a rib fall fatality occurred were not supported or otherwise adequately controlled. Hazardous rib conditions existed inby the last open crosscut on the right side of entries 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8. No rib supports of any type were installed for these hazardous ribs. Outby the last open crosscut for a distance of one crosscut, the right side ribs and the outby rib in the crosscuts contained hazardous rib conditions in all entries (1 through 9). This condition was obvious and extensive across the section for the last 550 feet, from survey station 16078 to survey station 16174 in the last open crosscut. In most of the outby places the ribs were inadequately supported with timbers, which did not control or prevent the ribs from falling. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
Standard 75.202(a) was cited 21 times in two years at mine 4608932 (23 to the operator, 0 to a contractor).
3. Order Number 7257553, was issued under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, for a violation of 30 CFR 75.370(a)(1):
The operator failed to follow the approved ventilation plan which was approved by MSHA on January 5, 2012, for MMU-004, the left side of No. 1 Section. Jeremy Sigler, Section Foreman, was fatally injured by a rib roll on March 10, 2012 while operating the continuous mining machine in the number 2 entry. The MMU-004 plan only approved a 20 foot maximum distance from the end of the line curtain to the deepest point of penetration in a working face. A cut deeper than 20 feet was taken in the No. 2 Entry measuring 36 feet-6 inches on the left side of the entry and 28 feet-2 inches on the right side of the entry, as measured from the last row of bolts. This violation increased the time that Sigler was exposed to the bad rib conditions in the No. 2 entry contributing to the cause of the accident. A copy of the approved ventilation plan was found in the clipboard belonging to Sigler and was found on the continuous mining machine after the accident. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
Standard 75.370(a)(1) was cited 21 times in two years at mine 4608932 (21 to the operator, 0 to a contractor).
4. Order Number 7257554, was issued under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, for a violation of 30 CFR 75.363(a):
Existing hazardous conditions were not posted with conspicuous danger signs or corrected before persons were exposed to these hazards. The ribs on the No. 1 Section were not supported or otherwise adequately controlled. Hazardous rib conditions existed inby the last open crosscut on the right side of entries 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8. No rib supports of any type were installed for these hazardous ribs. Outby the last open crosscut for a distance of one crosscut, the right side ribs and the outby rib in the crosscuts contained hazardous rib conditions in all entries (1 through 9). This condition was obvious and extensive across the section for the last 550 feet, from survey station 16078 to survey station 16174 in the last open crosscut. In most of the outby places the ribs were inadequately supported with timbers, which did not control or prevent the ribs from falling.
Jeremy Sigler, Section Foreman for the No. 1 Section noted with date, time and initials that an examination was made that had not occurred. Sigler was fatally injured on March 10, 2012 at approximately 6:15 p.m. in the No. 2 Entry where he was operating the continuous mining machine. Based on testimonies and a review of the mine tracking system he remained on the left side of the section after 2:24 p.m. His dates, times and initials for certification of examinations were found for 3/10/12 and the times listed in the following entries: No. 6 entry for 3:20, 5:30 and 7:35 p.m., No. 7 entry for 3:50 and 5:45 p.m., No. 8 entry for 4:45 and 5:50 p.m., and in the No. 9 entry for 4:03 and 5:55 p.m. Failure to properly perform examinations constitutes a reckless disregard to health and safety. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
5. Order Number 7257555, was issued under the provisions of Section 104(d) of the Mine Act, for a violation of 30 CFR 75.223(a)(1):
The operator is required to propose changes to the roof control plan when conditions indicate that the current plan is not suitable for controlling the roof, face and ribs of the mine. Revisions to the roof control plan were not proposed by the operator when conditions indicated that the roof control plan did not control the ribs as required. The Kingston 2 Mine began experiencing hazardous rib conditions on the No. 1 Section which have been present for the last 8 crosscuts. These hazardous rib conditions were reported 21 times, in the preshift and on-shift reports and 5 times in the production reports for this mine from February 14, 2012, to March 9, 2012. This condition was obvious and known at this operation. The Mine Foreman normally signs the reports and was on the No. 1 Section on March 7, 2012. The Mine Superintendent had not been on the section for to investigate the hazardous conditions that were reported for the past 2 weeks. Therefore, the failure to revise and provide adequate rib protection constitutes more than ordinary negligence. This is a violation of an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard, because the operator failed to exercise a high standard of care.
6. Order Number 7257556, was issued under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, for a violation of 30 CFR 75.360(b)(3):
An inadequate preshift examination was conducted for the evening shift on the No. 1 Section in the Kingston Number 2 Mine. A preshift examination was conducted by James Law, Day Shift Foreman, from 12:00 p.m. till 12:45 p.m. on March 10, 2012. The results of the examination was called out and received by Jeremy Sigler, Evening Shift Foreman. The preshift report was recorded and the conditions of roof and ribs were listed as being “OK at the time of examination”. Sigler was fatally injured by a rib roll at approximately 6:15 p.m., while operating the continuous mining machine in the number 2 entry on the 004-0 MMU side of the No. 1 Section. Hazardous rib conditions existed inby the last open crosscut on the right side of entries 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8. No rib supports of any type were installed for these hazardous ribs. Outby the last open crosscut for a distance of one crosscut, the right side ribs and the outby rib in the crosscut contained hazardous rib conditions in all entries (1 through 9). This condition was obvious and extensive across the section for the last 550 feet, from survey station 16078 to survey station 16174 in the last open crosscut. In most of these outby places the ribs were inadequately supported with timbers, which did not control or prevent the ribs from falling. Failure to properly perform examinations for hazardous conditions constitutes a reckless disregard to the health and safety of miners.
This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.